[libfko] Don't trundate > 16 byte Rijndael keys
Significant bug fix to honor the full encryption key length for user-supplied Rijndael keys > 16 bytes long. Previous to this bug fix, only the first 16 bytes of a key were actually used in the encryption/ decryption process even if the supplied key was longer. The result was a weakening of expected security for users that had keys > 16 bytes, although this is probably not too common. Note that "passphrase" is perhaps technically a better word for "user-supplied key" in this context since Rijndael in CBC mode derives a real encryption/decryption key from the passphrase through a series of applications of md5 against the passphrase and a random salt. This issue was reported by Michael T. Dean. Closes issue #18 on github.
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4
CREDITS
4
CREDITS
@ -95,3 +95,7 @@ Vlad Glagolev
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Sean Greven
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- Created a port of fwknop for FreeBSD:
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http://portsmon.freebsd.org/portoverview.py?category=security&portname=fwknop
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Michael T. Dean
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- Reported the Rijndael key truncation issue for user-supplied keys
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(passphrases) greater than 16 bytes long.
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11
ChangeLog
11
ChangeLog
@ -1,6 +1,17 @@
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fwknop-2.5 (//2013):
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- Major release of new functionality - HMAC SHA-256 support in the
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encrypt-then-authenticate model.
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- [libfko] Significant bug fix to honor the full encryption key length for
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user-supplied Rijndael keys > 16 bytes long. Previous to this bug fix,
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only the first 16 bytes of a key were actually used in the encryption/
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decryption process even if the supplied key was longer. The result was
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a weakening of expected security for users that had keys > 16 bytes,
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although this is probably not too common. Note that "passphrase" is
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perhaps technically a better word for "user-supplied key" in this
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context since Rijndael in CBC mode derives a real encryption/decryption
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key from the passphrase through a series of applications of md5 against
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the passphrase and a random salt. This issue was reported by Michael T.
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Dean. Closes issue #18 on github.
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- (Vlad Glagolev) Submitted an OpenBSD port for fwknop-2.0.4, and this has
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been checked in under the extras/openbsd/fwknop-2.0.4 directory.
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@ -118,11 +118,12 @@ static void
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rij_salt_and_iv(RIJNDAEL_context *ctx, const char *key,
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const int key_len, const unsigned char *data)
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{
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char pw_buf[RIJNDAEL_MIN_KEYSIZE];
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char pw_buf[RIJNDAEL_MAX_KEYSIZE];
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unsigned char tmp_buf[64]; /* How big does this need to be? */
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unsigned char kiv_buf[48]; /* Key and IV buffer */
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unsigned char md5_buf[16]; /* Buffer for computed md5 hash */
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unsigned char kiv_buf[RIJNDAEL_MAX_KEYSIZE+RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE]; /* Key and IV buffer */
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unsigned char md5_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LEN]; /* Buffer for computed md5 hash */
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int final_key_len = RIJNDAEL_MIN_KEYSIZE;
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size_t kiv_len = 0;
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/* First make pw 32 bytes (pad with "0" (ascii 0x30)) or truncate.
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@ -135,7 +136,10 @@ rij_salt_and_iv(RIJNDAEL_context *ctx, const char *key,
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memset(pw_buf+key_len, '0', RIJNDAEL_MIN_KEYSIZE - key_len);
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}
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else
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memcpy(pw_buf, key, RIJNDAEL_MIN_KEYSIZE);
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{
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memcpy(pw_buf, key, key_len);
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final_key_len = key_len;
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}
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/* If we are decrypting, data will contain the salt. Otherwise,
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* for encryption, we generate a random salt.
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@ -144,38 +148,38 @@ rij_salt_and_iv(RIJNDAEL_context *ctx, const char *key,
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{
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/* Pull the salt from the data
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*/
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memcpy(ctx->salt, (data+8), 8);
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memcpy(ctx->salt, (data+SALT_LEN), SALT_LEN);
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}
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else
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{
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/* Generate a random 8-byte salt.
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*/
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get_random_data(ctx->salt, 8);
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get_random_data(ctx->salt, SALT_LEN);
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}
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/* Now generate the key and initialization vector.
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* (again it is the perl Crypt::CBC way, with a touch of
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* fwknop).
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*/
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memcpy(tmp_buf+RIJNDAEL_MIN_KEYSIZE, pw_buf, RIJNDAEL_MIN_KEYSIZE);
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memcpy(tmp_buf+32, ctx->salt, 8);
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memcpy(tmp_buf+MD5_DIGEST_LEN, pw_buf, final_key_len);
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memcpy(tmp_buf+MD5_DIGEST_LEN+final_key_len, ctx->salt, SALT_LEN);
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while(kiv_len < sizeof(kiv_buf))
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{
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if(kiv_len == 0)
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md5(md5_buf, tmp_buf+16, 24);
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md5(md5_buf, tmp_buf+MD5_DIGEST_LEN, final_key_len+SALT_LEN);
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else
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md5(md5_buf, tmp_buf, 40);
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md5(md5_buf, tmp_buf, MD5_DIGEST_LEN+final_key_len+SALT_LEN);
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memcpy(tmp_buf, md5_buf, 16);
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memcpy(tmp_buf, md5_buf, MD5_DIGEST_LEN);
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memcpy(kiv_buf + kiv_len, md5_buf, 16);
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memcpy(kiv_buf + kiv_len, md5_buf, MD5_DIGEST_LEN);
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kiv_len += 16;
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kiv_len += MD5_DIGEST_LEN;
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}
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memcpy(ctx->key, kiv_buf, 32);
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memcpy(ctx->iv, kiv_buf+32, 16);
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memcpy(ctx->key, kiv_buf, RIJNDAEL_MAX_KEYSIZE);
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memcpy(ctx->iv, kiv_buf+RIJNDAEL_MAX_KEYSIZE, RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE);
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}
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/* Initialization entry point.
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@ -216,10 +220,10 @@ rij_encrypt(unsigned char *in, size_t in_len,
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/* Prepend the salt to the ciphertext...
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*/
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memcpy(ondx, "Salted__", 8);
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ondx+=8;
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memcpy(ondx, ctx.salt, 8);
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ondx+=8;
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memcpy(ondx, "Salted__", SALT_LEN);
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ondx+=SALT_LEN;
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memcpy(ondx, ctx.salt, SALT_LEN);
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ondx+=SALT_LEN;
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/* Add padding to the original plaintext to ensure that it is a
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* multiple of the Rijndael block size
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@ -44,6 +44,9 @@
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*/
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#define RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE 16
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#define RIJNDAEL_KEYSIZE 32
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#define RIJNDAEL_MIN_KEYSIZE 16
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#define RIJNDAEL_MAX_KEYSIZE 32
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#define SALT_LEN 8
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#define MODE_ECB 1 /* Are we ciphering in ECB mode? */
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#define MODE_CBC 2 /* Are we ciphering in CBC mode? */
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@ -54,9 +57,6 @@
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/* Allow keys of size 128 <= bits <= 256 */
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#define RIJNDAEL_MIN_KEYSIZE 16
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#define RIJNDAEL_MAX_KEYSIZE 32
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typedef struct {
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uint32_t keys[60]; /* maximum size of key schedule */
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uint32_t ikeys[60]; /* inverse key schedule */
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@ -64,8 +64,8 @@ typedef struct {
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int mode; /* encryption mode */
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/* Added by DSS */
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uint8_t key[RIJNDAEL_MAX_KEYSIZE];
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uint8_t iv[16];
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uint8_t salt[8];
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uint8_t iv[RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE];
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uint8_t salt[SALT_LEN];
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} RIJNDAEL_context;
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/* This basically performs Rijndael's key scheduling algorithm, as it's the
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@ -2407,6 +2407,14 @@ my @tests = (
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'function' => \&perl_fko_module_complete_cycle,
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'fatal' => $NO
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},
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{
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'category' => 'perl FKO module',
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'subcategory' => 'encrypt/decrypt',
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'detail' => 'truncated keys',
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'err_msg' => 'allowed truncated keys to decrypt SPA data',
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'function' => \&perl_fko_module_rijndael_truncated_keys,
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'fatal' => $NO
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},
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{
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'category' => 'perl FKO module',
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'subcategory' => 'encrypt/decrypt',
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@ -4190,6 +4198,83 @@ sub fuzzing_cmd_messages() {
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return \@msgs;
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}
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sub perl_fko_module_rijndael_truncated_keys() {
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my $test_hr = shift;
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my $rv = 1;
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for my $msg (@{valid_access_messages()}[0]) {
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for my $user (@{valid_usernames()}[0]) {
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for my $digest_type (@{valid_spa_digest_types()}[0]) {
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my $key = '1';
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for (my $i=2; $i <= 32; $i++) {
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$key .= $i % 10;
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if (length($key) < 16 and $key =~ /0$/) {
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### word around the trailing zero problem for now
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$key =~ s/0$/X/;
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}
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&write_test_file("[+] key: $key (" . length($key) . " bytes)\n",
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$curr_test_file);
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for (my $j=1; $j < length($key); $j++) {
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&write_test_file(" msg: $msg, user: $user, " .
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"digest type: $digest_type\n",
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$curr_test_file);
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$fko_obj = FKO->new();
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unless ($fko_obj) {
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&write_test_file("[-] error FKO->new(): " . FKO::error_str() . "\n",
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$curr_test_file);
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return 0;
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}
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$fko_obj->spa_message($msg);
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$fko_obj->username($user);
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$fko_obj->spa_message_type(FKO->FKO_ACCESS_MSG);
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$fko_obj->digest_type($digest_type);
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$fko_obj->spa_data_final($key, length($key), '', 0);
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my $encrypted_msg = $fko_obj->spa_data();
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$fko_obj->destroy();
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### now get new object for decryption
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$fko_obj = FKO->new();
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unless ($fko_obj) {
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&write_test_file("[-] error FKO->new(): " . FKO::error_str() . "\n",
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$curr_test_file);
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return 0;
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}
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$fko_obj->spa_data($encrypted_msg);
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my $truncated_key = $key;
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$truncated_key =~ s/^(.{$j}).*/$1/;
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if ($fko_obj->decrypt_spa_data($truncated_key,
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length($truncated_key)) == FKO->FKO_SUCCESS) {
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&write_test_file("[-] $msg decrypt success with truncated key " .
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"($key -> $truncated_key)\n",
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$curr_test_file);
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$rv = 0;
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} else {
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&write_test_file("[+] $msg decrypt rejected truncated " .
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"key ($key -> $truncated_key)\n",
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$curr_test_file);
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}
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$fko_obj->destroy();
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}
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&write_test_file("\n", $curr_test_file);
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}
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}
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}
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}
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return $rv;
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}
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sub perl_fko_module_complete_cycle() {
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my $test_hr = shift;
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