531 lines
21 KiB
Groff
531 lines
21 KiB
Groff
'\" t
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.\" Title: fwknop
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.\" Author: [see the "AUTHOR" section]
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.\" Generator: DocBook XSL Stylesheets v1.74.3 <http://docbook.sf.net/>
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.\" Date: 09/05/2009
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.\" Manual:
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.\" Source:
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.\" Language: English
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.\"
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.TH "FWKNOP" "8" "09/05/2009" "" ""
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.\" -----------------------------------------------------------------
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.\" * set default formatting
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.\" -----------------------------------------------------------------
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.\" disable hyphenation
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.nh
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.\" disable justification (adjust text to left margin only)
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.ad l
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.\" -----------------------------------------------------------------
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.\" * MAIN CONTENT STARTS HERE *
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.\" -----------------------------------------------------------------
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.SH "NAME"
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fwknop \- Firewall Knock Operator
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.SH "SYNOPSIS"
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.sp
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\fBfwknop\fR \fB\-A\fR <\fIproto/ports\fR> \fB\-R\fR|\fB\-a\fR|\fB\-s \-D\fR <\fIhost\fR> [\fIoptions\fR]
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.SH "DESCRIPTION"
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.sp
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\fBfwknop\fR implements an authorization scheme known as Single Packet Authorization (SPA) for Linux systems running iptables, and for Mac OS X and FreeBSD systems running ipfw\&. This mechanism requires only a single encrypted and non\-replayed packet to communicate various pieces of information including desired access through an iptables or ipfw policy\&. The main application of this program is to use iptables or ipfw in a default\-drop stance to protect services such as \fISSH\fR with an additional layer of security in order to make the exploitation of vulnerabilities (both 0\-day and unpatched code) much more difficult\&.
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.sp
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An authorization server \fBfwknopd\fR passively monitors authorization packets via \fIlibpcap\fR and hence there is no "server" to which to connect in the traditional sense\&. Any service protected by \fBfwknop\fR is inaccessible (by using \fIiptables\fR or \fIipfw\fR to intercept packets within the kernel) before authenticating; anyone scanning for the service will not be able to detect that it is even listening\&. Single Packet Authorization offers many advantages over port knocking, including non\-replayability of SPA packets, ability to use asymmetric ciphers (such as Elgamal), and SPA cannot be broken by simply spoofing packets to duplicate ports within the knock sequence on the server to break port knocking authentication\&.
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.sp
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SPA packets can easily be spoofed as well (this is a good thing in this context), and this makes it possible to make it appear as though, say, www\&.yahoo\&.com is trying to authenticate to a target system but in reality the actual connection will come from a seemingly unrelated IP\&. Although the default data collection method in Single Packet Authorization mode is to use libpcap to sniff packets off the wire, \fBfwknop\fR can also read packets out of a file that is written by the iptables ulogd pcap writer (or a separate sniffer process that is writing packet data to a file)\&.
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.sp
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Authorization packets are either encrypted with the \fIRijndael\fR block cipher or via \fIGnuPG\fR and associated asymmetric ciphers\&. If the symmetric encryption method is chosen, then the encryption key is shared between the client and server (see the \fI/etc/fwknop/access\&.conf\fR file)\&. If the GnuPG method is chosen, then the encryption keys are derived from GnuPG key rings\&. SPA packets generated by fwknop running as a client adhere to the following format (before they are encrypted):
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.sp
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.if n \{\
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.RS 4
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.\}
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.nf
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random number (16 bytes)
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username
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timestamp
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software version
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mode (command mode (0) or access mode (1))
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if command mode => command to execute
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else access mode => IP,proto,port
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message digest (SHA256 / SHA1 / MD5)
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.fi
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.if n \{\
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.RE
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.\}
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.sp
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Each of the above fields are separated by a \(lq:\(rq character due to the variable length of several of the fields, and those that might contain \(lq:\(rq characters are base64 encoded\&. The message digest (\fBSHA256\fR by default in all versions of \fBfwknop\fR greater than 1\&.9\&.1) allows the server to check message integrity after decryption, and the 16 bytes of random data ensures (with high probability) that no two messages are identical\&. This ensures that replay attacks are not possible against \fBfwknop\fR\&.
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.sp
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For each packet coming from an \fBfwknop\fR client, the \fBfwknopd\fR server caches the \fBSHA256\fR digest calculated over the entire packet and compares against previous packet digests in order to detect attempted replay attacks\&. The digest cache file is located at \fI/var/log/fwknop/digest\&.cache\fR and is not rotated so that the detection of duplicate SPA messages is maximized\&. Both syslog and email alerts are generated if a replay is detected (although this can be tuned via the \fBALERTING_METHODS\fR variable in the \fI/etc/fwknop/fwknop\&.conf\fR file)\&. By default, the \fBfwknop\fR client sends authorization packets over UDP port 62201, but this can be altered with the \fB\-\-Server\-port\fR argument\&. The server must first be configured to acquire the SPA data on the changed protocol\-port\&. Also, \fBfwknop\fR can send the SPA packet over a random port via the \fB\-\-rand\-port\fR argument\&. See \fIfwknopd(8)\fR for further details\&. See the \fBEXAMPLES\fR section for example invocations of the \fBfwknop\fR client\&.
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.SH "REQUIRED ARGUMENTS"
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.PP
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\fB\-D, \-\-destination\fR=\fI<IP\-address>\fR
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.RS 4
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Direct the
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\fBfwknop\fR
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client to authenticate with the
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\fBfwknopd\fR
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daemon/service at the destination address <IP>\&. The connection mode is discovered by the
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\fBfwknopd\fR
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daemon/service when it decrypts and parses the authentication packet\&.
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.RE
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.PP
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\fB\-A, \-\-access\fR=\fI<port list>\fR
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.RS 4
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Provide a list of ports and protocols to access on a remote computer running
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\fBfwknopd\fR\&. The format of this list is \(lq<proto>/<port>\&...<proto>/<port>\(rq, e\&.g\&. \(lqtcp/22,udp/53\(rq\&.
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\fBNOTE:\fR
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The vast majority of usages for
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\fBfwknop\fR
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require the
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\fB\-A\fR
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argument, but sending full commands with the
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\fB\-\-Server\-cmd\fR
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argument via an SPA packet to be executed by
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\fBfwknopd\fR
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does not require this argument\&.
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.RE
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.PP
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\fB\-R|\-a|\-s\fR
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.RS 4
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One of these options (see below) is required to tell the remote
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\fBfwknopd\fR
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daemon what IP should be let through the local firewall\&. It is recommend to use the
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\fB\-R\fR
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or
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\fB\-a\fR
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options instead of
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\fB\-s\fR
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in order to harden SPA communications against possible MITM attacks\&.
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.RE
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.SH "GENERAL OPTIONS"
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.PP
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\fB\-h, \-\-help\fR
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.RS 4
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Print a usage summary message and exit\&.
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.RE
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.PP
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\fB\-B, \-\-save\-packet\fR=\fI<file>\fR
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.RS 4
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Instruct the
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\fBfwknop\fR
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client to write a newly created SPA packet out to the specified file so that it can be examined off\-line\&.
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.RE
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.PP
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\fB\-G, \-\-get\-key\fR=\fI<file>\fR
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.RS 4
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Load an encryption key/password from the specified file\&.
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.RE
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.PP
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\fB\-\-show\-last\fR
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.RS 4
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Display the last command\-line arguments used by
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\fBfwknop\fR\&.
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.RE
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.PP
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\fB\-q, \-\-quiet\fR
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.RS 4
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Perform
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\fBfwknop\fR
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functions quietly (suppress informational output)\&.
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.RE
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.PP
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\fB\-T, \-\-test\fR
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.RS 4
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Test mode\&. Generate the SPA packet data, but do not send it\&. Instead, print a break\-down of the SPA data fields, then run the data through the decryption and decoding process and print the break\-down again\&. This is primarily a debugging feature\&.
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.RE
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.PP
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\fB\-v, \-\-verbose\fR
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.RS 4
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Run the
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\fBfwknop\fR
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client in verbose mode\&.
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.RE
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.PP
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\fB\-V, \-\-Version\fR
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.RS 4
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Display version information and exit\&.
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.RE
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.SH "SPA OPTIONS"
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.PP
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\fB\-a, \-\-allow\-ip\fR=\fI<IP\-address>\fR
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.RS 4
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Specify IP address that should be permitted through the destination
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\fBfwknopd\fR
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server firewall (this IP is encrypted within the SPA packet itself)\&. This is useful to prevent a
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\fIMan\-In\-The\-Middle\fR
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(MTIM) attack where an SPA packet can be intercepted enroute and sent from a different IP than the original\&. Hence, if the
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\fBfwknopd\fR
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server trusts the source address on the SPA packet IP header then the attacker gains access\&. The
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\fB\-a\fR
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option puts the source address within the encrypted SPA packet, and so thwarts this attack\&. The
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\fB\-a\fR
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option is also useful to specify the IP that will be granted access when the SPA packet itself is spoofed with the
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\fB\-\-spoof\-src\fR
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option\&. Another related option is
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\fB\-R\fR
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(see below) which instructs the
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\fBfwknop\fR
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client to automatically resolve the externally routable IP address the local system is connected to by querying the
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\fIhttp://www\&.whatismyip\&.com\fR
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website\&.
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.RE
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.PP
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\fB\-g, \-\-gpg\-encryption\fR
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.RS 4
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Use GPG encryption on the SPA packet (default if not specified is Rijndael)\&.
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\fBNote:\fR
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Use of this option will require the specification of a GPG recipient (see
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\fB\-\-gpg\-recipient\fR
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along with other GPG\-related options below)\&.
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.RE
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.PP
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\fB\-m, \-\-digest\-type\fR=\fI<digest>\fR
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.RS 4
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Specify the message digest algorithm to use in the SPA data\&. Choices are:
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\fBmd5\fR,
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\fBsha1\fR,
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\fBsha256\fR
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(the default),
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\fBsha384\fR, and
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\fBsha512\fR\&.
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.RE
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.PP
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\fB\-N, \-\-nat\-access\fR=\fI<internalIP:forwardPort>\fR
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.RS 4
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The
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\fBfwknopd\fR
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server offers the ability to provide SPA access through an iptables firewall to an internal service by interfacing with the iptables NAT capabilities\&. So, if the
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\fBfwknopd\fR
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server is protecting an internal network on an RFC\-1918 address space, an external
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\fBfwknop\fR
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client can request that the server port forward an external port to an internal IP, i\&.e\&. \(lq\-\-NAT\-access 192\&.168\&.10\&.2:55000\(rq\&. In this case, access will be granted to 192\&.168\&.10\&.2 via port 55000 to whatever service is requested via the
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\fB\-\-access\fR
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argument (usually tcp/22)\&. Hence, after sending such an SPA packet, one would then do \(lqssh \-p 55000 user@host\(rq and the connection would be forwarded on through to the internal 192\&.168\&.10\&.2 system automatically\&. Note that the port \(lq55000\(rq can be randomly generated via the
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\fB\-\-nat\-rand\-port\fR
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argument (described later)\&.
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.RE
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.PP
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\fB\-\-nat\-local\fR
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.RS 4
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On the
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\fBfwknopd\fR
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server, a NAT operation can apply to the local system instead of being forwarded through the system\&. That is, for iptables firewalls, a connection to, say, port 55,000 can be translated to port 22 on the local system\&. By making use of the
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\fB\-\-nat\-local\fR
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argument, the
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\fBfwknop\fR
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client can be made to request such access\&. This means that any external attacker would only see a connection over port 55,000 instead of the expected port 22 after the SPA packet is sent\&.
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.RE
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.PP
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\fB\-\-nat\-rand\-port\fR
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.RS 4
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Usually
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\fBfwknop\fR
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is used to request access to a specific port such as tcp/22 on a system running
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\fBfwknopd\fR\&. However, by using the
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\fB\-\-nat\-rand\-port\fR
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argument, it is possible to request access to a particular service (again, such as tcp/22), but have this access granted via a random translated port\&. That is, once the
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\fBfwknop\fR
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client has been executed in this mode and the random port selected by
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\fBfwknop\fR
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is displayed, the destination port used by the follow\-on client must be changed to match this random port\&. For SSH, this is accomplished via the
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\fB\-p\fR
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argument\&. See the
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\fB\-\-nat\-local\fR
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and
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\fB\-\-nat\-access\fR
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command line arguments to
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\fBfwknop\fR
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for additional details on gaining access to services via a NAT operation\&.
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.RE
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.PP
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\fB\-p, \-\-server\-port\fR=\fI<port>\fR
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.RS 4
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Specify the port number where
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\fBfwknopd\fR
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accepts packets via libpcap or ulogd pcap writer\&. By default
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\fBfwknopd\fR
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looks for authorization packets over UDP port 62201\&.
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.RE
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.PP
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\fB\-P, \-\-server\-proto\fR=\fI<protocol>\fR
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.RS 4
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Set the protocol (udp, tcp, tcpraw, icmp) for the outgoing SPA packet\&. Note: The
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\fBtcpraw\fR
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and
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\fBicmp\fR
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modes use raw sockets and thus require root access to run\&. Also note: The
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\fBtcp\fR
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mode expects to establish a TCP connection to the server before sending the SPA packet\&. This is not normally done, but is useful for compatibility with the Tor for strong anonymity; see
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\fIhttp://tor\&.eff\&.org/\fR\&. In this case, the
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\fBfwknopd\fR
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server uses the
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\fBfwknop_serv\fR
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daemon to listen on a TCP port (62201 by default)\&.
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.RE
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.PP
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\fB\-Q, \-\-spoof\-src\fR=\fI<IP>\fR
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.RS 4
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Spoof the source address from which the
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\fBfwknop\fR
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client sends SPA packets\&. This requires root on the client side access since a raw socket is required to accomplish this\&. Note that the
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\fB\-\-spoof\-user\fR
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argument can be given in this mode in order to pass any
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\fBREQUIRE_USERNAME\fR
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keyword that might be specified in
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\fI/etc/fwknop/access\&.conf\fR\&.
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.RE
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.PP
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\fB\-r, \-\-rand\-port\fR
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.RS 4
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Instruct the
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\fBfwknop\fR
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client to send an SPA packet over a random destination port between 10,000 and 65535\&. The
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\fBfwknopd\fR
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server must use a
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\fBPCAP_FILTER\fR
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variable that is configured to accept such packets\&. For example, the
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\fBPCAP_FILTER\fR
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variable could be set to: \(lqudp dst portrange 10000\-65535\(rq\&.
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.RE
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.PP
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\fB\-R, \-\-resolve\-ip\-http\fR
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.RS 4
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This is an important option, and instructs the
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\fBfwknop\fR
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client and the
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\fBfwknopd\fR
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daemon/service to query
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\fIhttp://www\&.whatismyip\&.com\fR
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to determine the IP address that should be allowed through the iptables policy at the remote fwknopd server side\&. This is useful if the
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\fBfwknop\fR
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client is being used on a system that is behind an obscure NAT address\&.
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.RE
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.PP
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\fB\-s, \-\-source\-ip\fR
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.RS 4
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Instruct the
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\fBfwknop\fR
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client to form an SPA packet that contains the special\-case IP address \(lq0\&.0\&.0\&.0\(rq which will inform the destination
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\fBfwknopd\fR
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SPA server to use the source IP address from which the SPA packet originates as the IP that will be allowed through upon modification of the firewall ruleset\&. This option is useful if the
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\fBfwknop\fR
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client is deployed on a machine that is behind a NAT device\&. The permit\-address options
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\fB\-s\fR
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(default),
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\fB\-R\fR
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and
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\fB\-a\fR
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are mutually exclusive\&.
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.RE
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.PP
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|
\fB\-\-time\-offset\-plus\fR=\fI<time>\fR
|
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.RS 4
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|
By default, the
|
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\fBfwknopd\fR
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daemon on the server side enforces time synchronization between the clocks running on client and server systems\&. The
|
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\fBfwknop\fR
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client places the local time within each SPA packet as a time stamp to be validated by the fwknopd server after decryption\&. However, in some circumstances, if the clocks are out of sync and the user on the client system does not have the required access to change the local clock setting, it can be difficult to construct and SPA packet with a time stamp the server will accept\&. In this situation, the
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\fB\-\-time\-offset\-plus\fR
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option can allow the user to specify an offset (e\&.g\&. \(lq60sec\(rq \(lq60min\(rq \(lq2days\(rq etc\&.) that is added to the local time\&.
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.RE
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.PP
|
|
\fB\-\-time\-offset\-minus\fR=\fI<time>\fR
|
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.RS 4
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|
This is similar to the
|
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\fB\-\-time\-offset\-plus\fR
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option (see above), but subtracts the specified time offset instead of adding it to the local time stamp\&.
|
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.RE
|
|
.PP
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|
\fB\-u, \-\-user\-agent\fR=\fI<user\-agent\-string>\fR
|
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.RS 4
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|
Set the HTTP User\-Agent for resolving the external IP via
|
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\fB\-R\fR, or for sending SPA packets over HTTP\&.
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.RE
|
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.PP
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|
\fB\-U, \-\-spoof\-user\fR=\fI<user>\fR
|
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.RS 4
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|
Specify the username that is included within SPA packet\&. This allows the
|
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\fBfwknop\fR
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client to satisfy any non\-root
|
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\fBREQUIRE_USERNAME\fR
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|
keyword on the fwknopd server (\fB\-\-spoof\-src\fR
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|
mode requires that the
|
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\fBfwknop\fR
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client is executed as root)\&.
|
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.RE
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|
.SH "GPG-RELATED OPTIONS"
|
|
.PP
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|
\fB\-\-gpg\-agent\fR
|
|
.RS 4
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Instruct
|
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\fBfwknop\fR
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|
to acquire GnuPG key password from a running gpg\-agent instance (if available)\&.
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.RE
|
|
.PP
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|
\fB\-\-gpg\-home\-dir\fR=\fI<dir>\fR
|
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.RS 4
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Specify the path to the GnuPG directory; normally this path is derived from the home directory of the user that is running the
|
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\fBfwknop\fR
|
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client\&. This is useful when a \(lqroot\(rq user wishes to log into a remote machine whose sshd daemon/service does not permit root login\&.
|
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.RE
|
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.PP
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|
\fB\-\-gpg\-recipient\fR=\fI<key ID or Name>\fR
|
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.RS 4
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|
Specify the GnuPG key ID, e\&.g\&. \(lq1234ABCD\(rq (see the output of "gpg \-\-list\-keys") or the key name (associated email address) of the recipient of the Single Packet Authorization message\&. This key is imported by the
|
|
\fBfwknopd\fR
|
|
server and the associated private key is used to decrypt the SPA packet\&. The recipient\(cqs key must first be imported into the client GnuPG key ring\&.
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|
.RE
|
|
.PP
|
|
\fB\-\-gpg\-signer\-key\fR=\fI<key ID or Name>\fR
|
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.RS 4
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|
Specify the GnuPG key ID, e\&.g\&. \(lqABCD1234\(rq (see the output of \(lqgpg \-\-list\-keys\(rq) or the key name to use when signing the SPA message\&. The user is prompted for the associated GnuPG password to create the signature\&. This adds a cryptographically strong mechanism to allow the
|
|
\fBfwknopd\fR
|
|
daemon on the remote server to authenticate who created the SPA message\&.
|
|
.RE
|
|
.SH "ENVIRONMENT"
|
|
.sp
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\fBGPG_AGENT_INFO\fR (only used in \fB\-\-gpg\-agent\fR mode)\&.
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.SH "EXAMPLES"
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.sp
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The following examples illustrate the command line arguments that could be supplied to the fwknop client in a few situations:
|
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.SS "Access mode examples"
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.sp
|
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Packet contents printed to stdout at the fwknop client when creating an \(lqaccess mode\(rq SPA packet:
|
|
.sp
|
|
.\" .if n \{\
|
|
.\" .RS 4
|
|
.\" .\}
|
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.\" .nf
|
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.ft CW
|
|
.nf
|
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.ne 1
|
|
Random data: 6565240948266426
|
|
Username: mbr
|
|
Timestamp: 1203863233
|
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Version: 1\&.9\&.2
|
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Type: 1 (access mode)
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Access: 127\&.0\&.0\&.2,tcp/22
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SHA256 sum: gngquSL8AuM7r27XsR4qPmJhuBo9pG2PYwII06AaJHw
|
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.ft R
|
|
.fi
|
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.\" .fi
|
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.\" .if n \{\
|
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.\" .RE
|
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.\" .\}
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.sp
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|
Use the Single Packet Authorization mode to gain access to tcp/22 (ssh) and udp/53 running on the system 10\&.0\&.0\&.123 from the IP 192\&.168\&.10\&.4:
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.sp
|
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.\" .if n \{\
|
|
.\" .RS 4
|
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.\" .\}
|
|
.\" .nf
|
|
.ft CW
|
|
.nf
|
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.ne 1
|
|
$ fwknop \-A "tcp/22,udp/53" \-a 192\&.168\&.10\&.4 \-D 10\&.0\&.0\&.123
|
|
.ft R
|
|
.fi
|
|
.\" .fi
|
|
.\" .if n \{\
|
|
.\" .RE
|
|
.\" .\}
|
|
.sp
|
|
Same as above example, but gain access from whatever source IP is seen by the fwknop server (useful if the fwknop client is behind a NAT device):
|
|
.sp
|
|
.\" .if n \{\
|
|
.\" .RS 4
|
|
.\" .\}
|
|
.\" .nf
|
|
.ft CW
|
|
.nf
|
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.ne 1
|
|
$ fwknop \-A "tcp/22,udp/53" \-s \-D 10\&.0\&.0\&.123
|
|
.ft R
|
|
.fi
|
|
.\" .fi
|
|
.\" .if n \{\
|
|
.\" .RE
|
|
.\" .\}
|
|
.sp
|
|
Same as above example, but use the IP identification website \fIhttp://www\&.whatismyip\&.com\fR to derive the client IP address\&. This is a safer method of acquiring the client IP address than using the \fB\-s\fR option because the source IP is put within the encrypted packet instead of having the \fBfwknopd\fR daemon grant the requested access from whatever IP address the SPA packet originates:
|
|
.sp
|
|
.\" .if n \{\
|
|
.\" .RS 4
|
|
.\" .\}
|
|
.\" .nf
|
|
.ft CW
|
|
.nf
|
|
.ne 1
|
|
$ fwknop \-A "tcp/22,udp/53" \-R \-D 10\&.0\&.0\&.123
|
|
.ft R
|
|
.fi
|
|
.\" .fi
|
|
.\" .if n \{\
|
|
.\" .RE
|
|
.\" .\}
|
|
.sp
|
|
Use the Single Packet Authorization mode to gain access to tcp/22 (ssh) and udp/53 running on the system 10\&.0\&.0\&.123, and use GnuPG keys to encrypt and decrypt:
|
|
.sp
|
|
.\" .if n \{\
|
|
.\" .RS 4
|
|
.\" .\}
|
|
.\" .nf
|
|
.ft CW
|
|
.nf
|
|
.ne 1
|
|
$ fwknop \-A "tcp/22,udp/53" \-\-gpg\-sign ABCD1234 \-\-gpg\-\-recipient
|
|
1234ABCD \-R \-D 10\&.0\&.0\&.123
|
|
.ft R
|
|
.fi
|
|
.\" .fi
|
|
.\" .if n \{\
|
|
.\" .RE
|
|
.\" .\}
|
|
.sp
|
|
Instruct the fwknop server running at 10\&.0\&.0\&.123 to allow 172\&.16\&.5\&.4 to connect to TCP/22, but spoof the authorization packet from an IP associated with www\&.yahoo\&.com:
|
|
.sp
|
|
.\" .if n \{\
|
|
.\" .RS 4
|
|
.\" .\}
|
|
.\" .nf
|
|
.ft CW
|
|
.nf
|
|
.ne 1
|
|
# fwknop \-\-Spoof\-src \(cqwww\&.yahoo\&.com\(cq \-A tcp/22 \-a 172\&.16\&.5\&.4 \-D
|
|
10\&.0\&.0\&.123
|
|
.ft R
|
|
.fi
|
|
.\" .fi
|
|
.\" .if n \{\
|
|
.\" .RE
|
|
.\" .\}
|
|
.SH "DEPENDENCIES"
|
|
.sp
|
|
\fBfwknop\fR requires \fIlibfko\fR (which is normally included with both source and binary distributions\&.
|
|
.sp
|
|
For GPG functionality, GnuPG must also be correctly installed and configured\&.
|
|
.sp
|
|
To take advantage of all of the authentication and access management features of the \fBfwknopd\fR daemon/service a functioning iptables firewall is required on the underlying operating system\&.
|
|
.SH "DIAGNOSTICS"
|
|
.sp
|
|
fwknop can be run with the \fB\-T\fR (or \fB\-\-test\fR) command line option\&. This will have \fBfwkop\fR simply create and print the SPA packet information, then run it through a decrypt/decode cycle and print it again\&.
|
|
.SH "SEE ALSO"
|
|
.sp
|
|
fwknopd(8), iptables(8), gpg(1), gpg\-agent(1), libfko documentation\&.
|
|
.sp
|
|
More information on Single Packet Authorization can be found in the paper \(lqSingle Packet Authorization with fwknop\(rq available at \fIhttp://www\&.cipherdyne\&.org/fwknop/docs/SPA\&.html\fR\&.
|
|
.SH "AUTHOR"
|
|
.sp
|
|
Damien Stuart <dstuart@dstuart\&.org>
|
|
.br
|
|
Michael Rash <mbr@cipherdyne\&.org>
|
|
.sp
|
|
.SH "CONTRIBUTORS"
|
|
.sp
|
|
This \(lqC\(rq version of fwknop was derived from the original Perl\-based version on which many people who are active in the open source community have contributed\&. See the CREDITS file in the fwknop sources, or visit \fIhttp://www\&.cipherdyne\&.org/fwknop/docs/contributors\&.html\fR to view the online list of contributors\&.
|
|
.sp
|
|
The phrase \(lqSingle Packet Authorization\(rq was coined by MadHat and Simple Nomad at the BlackHat Briefings of 2005 (see: \fIhttp://www\&.nmrc\&.org\fR)\&.
|
|
.SH "BUGS"
|
|
.sp
|
|
Send bug reports to dstuart@dstuart\&.org\&. Suggestions and/or comments are always welcome as well\&.
|
|
.SH "DISTRIBUTION"
|
|
.sp
|
|
\fBfwknop\fR is distributed under the GNU General Public License (GPL), and the latest version may be downloaded from \fIhttp://www\&.cipherdyne\&.org\fR\&.
|