- [server] When GnuPG is used, the default now is to require that incoming SPA packets are signed by a key listed in GPG_REMOTE_ID for each access.conf stanza. In other words, the usage of GPG_REQUIRE_SIG is no longer necessary in order to authenticate SPA packets via the GnuPG signature. Verification of GnuPG signatures can be disabled with a new access.conf variable GPG_DISABLE_SIG, but this is NOT a recommended configuration. - [client+server] Add --gpg-exe command line argument and GPG_EXE config variable to ~/.fwknoprc and the access.conf file so that the path to GnuPG can be changed from the default /usr/bin/gpg path.
887 lines
30 KiB
C
887 lines
30 KiB
C
/*
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*****************************************************************************
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*
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* File: incoming_spa.c
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*
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* Purpose: Process an incoming SPA data packet for fwknopd.
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*
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* Fwknop is developed primarily by the people listed in the file 'AUTHORS'.
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* Copyright (C) 2009-2014 fwknop developers and contributors. For a full
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* list of contributors, see the file 'CREDITS'.
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*
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* License (GNU General Public License):
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
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* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
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* of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
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*
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* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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* GNU General Public License for more details.
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*
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
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* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307
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* USA
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*
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*****************************************************************************
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*/
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#include "fwknopd_common.h"
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#include "netinet_common.h"
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#if HAVE_SYS_WAIT_H
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#include <sys/wait.h>
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#endif
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#include "incoming_spa.h"
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#include "access.h"
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#include "extcmd.h"
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#include "log_msg.h"
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#include "utils.h"
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#include "fw_util.h"
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#include "fwknopd_errors.h"
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#include "replay_cache.h"
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#define CTX_DUMP_BUFSIZE 4096 /*!< Maximum size allocated to a FKO context dump */
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/* Validate and in some cases preprocess/reformat the SPA data. Return an
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* error code value if there is any indication the data is not valid spa data.
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*/
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static int
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preprocess_spa_data(fko_srv_options_t *opts, const char *src_ip)
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{
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spa_pkt_info_t *spa_pkt = &(opts->spa_pkt);
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char *ndx = (char *)&(spa_pkt->packet_data);
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int pkt_data_len = spa_pkt->packet_data_len;
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int i;
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/* At this point, we can reset the packet data length to 0. This is our
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* indicator to the rest of the program that we do not have a current
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* spa packet to process (after this one that is).
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*/
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spa_pkt->packet_data_len = 0;
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/* These two checks are already done in process_packet(), but this is a
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* defensive measure to run them again here
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*/
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if(pkt_data_len < MIN_SPA_DATA_SIZE)
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return(SPA_MSG_BAD_DATA);
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if(pkt_data_len > MAX_SPA_PACKET_LEN)
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return(SPA_MSG_BAD_DATA);
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/* Ignore any SPA packets that contain the Rijndael or GnuPG prefixes
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* since an attacker might have tacked them on to a previously seen
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* SPA packet in an attempt to get past the replay check. And, we're
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* no worse off since a legitimate SPA packet that happens to include
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* a prefix after the outer one is stripped off won't decrypt properly
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* anyway because libfko would not add a new one.
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*/
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if(constant_runtime_cmp(ndx, B64_RIJNDAEL_SALT, B64_RIJNDAEL_SALT_STR_LEN) == 0)
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return(SPA_MSG_BAD_DATA);
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if(pkt_data_len > MIN_GNUPG_MSG_SIZE
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&& constant_runtime_cmp(ndx, B64_GPG_PREFIX, B64_GPG_PREFIX_STR_LEN) == 0)
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return(SPA_MSG_BAD_DATA);
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/* Detect and parse out SPA data from an HTTP request. If the SPA data
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* starts with "GET /" and the user agent starts with "Fwknop", then
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* assume it is a SPA over HTTP request.
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*/
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if(strncasecmp(opts->config[CONF_ENABLE_SPA_OVER_HTTP], "N", 1) == 0
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&& strncasecmp(ndx, "GET /", 5) == 0
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&& strstr(ndx, "User-Agent: Fwknop") != NULL)
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{
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/* This looks like an HTTP request, so let's see if we are
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* configured to accept such request and if so, find the SPA
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* data.
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*/
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/* Now extract, adjust (convert characters translated by the fwknop
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* client), and reset the SPA message itself.
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*/
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strlcpy((char *)spa_pkt->packet_data, ndx+5, pkt_data_len);
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for(i=0; i<pkt_data_len; i++)
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{
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if(isspace(*ndx)) /* The first space marks the end of the req */
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{
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*ndx = '\0';
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break;
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}
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else if(*ndx == '-') /* Convert '-' to '+' */
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*ndx = '+';
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else if(*ndx == '_') /* Convert '_' to '/' */
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*ndx = '/';
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ndx++;
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}
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}
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/* Require base64-encoded data
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*/
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if(! is_base64(spa_pkt->packet_data, pkt_data_len))
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return(SPA_MSG_NOT_SPA_DATA);
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/* --DSS: Are there other checks we can do here ??? */
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/* If we made it here, we have no reason to assume this is not SPA data
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* (at least until we come up with more checks).
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*/
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return(FKO_SUCCESS);
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}
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/* For replay attack detection
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*/
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static int
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get_raw_digest(char **digest, char *pkt_data)
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{
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fko_ctx_t ctx = NULL;
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char *tmp_digest = NULL;
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int res = FKO_SUCCESS;
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/* initialize an FKO context with no decryption key just so
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* we can get the outer message digest
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*/
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res = fko_new_with_data(&ctx, (char *)pkt_data, NULL, 0,
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FKO_DEFAULT_ENC_MODE, NULL, 0, 0);
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if(res != FKO_SUCCESS)
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{
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log_msg(LOG_WARNING, "Error initializing FKO context from SPA data: %s",
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fko_errstr(res));
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fko_destroy(ctx);
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ctx = NULL;
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return(SPA_MSG_FKO_CTX_ERROR);
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}
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res = fko_set_raw_spa_digest_type(ctx, FKO_DEFAULT_DIGEST);
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if(res != FKO_SUCCESS)
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{
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log_msg(LOG_WARNING, "Error setting digest type for SPA data: %s",
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fko_errstr(res));
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fko_destroy(ctx);
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ctx = NULL;
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return(SPA_MSG_DIGEST_ERROR);
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}
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res = fko_set_raw_spa_digest(ctx);
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if(res != FKO_SUCCESS)
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{
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log_msg(LOG_WARNING, "Error setting digest for SPA data: %s",
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fko_errstr(res));
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fko_destroy(ctx);
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ctx = NULL;
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return(SPA_MSG_DIGEST_ERROR);
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}
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res = fko_get_raw_spa_digest(ctx, &tmp_digest);
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if(res != FKO_SUCCESS)
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{
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log_msg(LOG_WARNING, "Error getting digest from SPA data: %s",
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fko_errstr(res));
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fko_destroy(ctx);
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ctx = NULL;
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return(SPA_MSG_DIGEST_ERROR);
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}
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*digest = strdup(tmp_digest);
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if (*digest == NULL)
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res = SPA_MSG_ERROR; /* really a strdup() memory allocation problem */
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fko_destroy(ctx);
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ctx = NULL;
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return res;
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}
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/* Popluate a spa_data struct from an initialized (and populated) FKO context.
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*/
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static int
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get_spa_data_fields(fko_ctx_t ctx, spa_data_t *spdat)
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{
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int res = FKO_SUCCESS;
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res = fko_get_username(ctx, &(spdat->username));
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if(res != FKO_SUCCESS)
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return(res);
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res = fko_get_timestamp(ctx, &(spdat->timestamp));
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if(res != FKO_SUCCESS)
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return(res);
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res = fko_get_version(ctx, &(spdat->version));
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if(res != FKO_SUCCESS)
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return(res);
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res = fko_get_spa_message_type(ctx, &(spdat->message_type));
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if(res != FKO_SUCCESS)
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return(res);
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res = fko_get_spa_message(ctx, &(spdat->spa_message));
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if(res != FKO_SUCCESS)
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return(res);
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res = fko_get_spa_nat_access(ctx, &(spdat->nat_access));
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if(res != FKO_SUCCESS)
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return(res);
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res = fko_get_spa_server_auth(ctx, &(spdat->server_auth));
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if(res != FKO_SUCCESS)
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return(res);
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res = fko_get_spa_client_timeout(ctx, (int *)&(spdat->client_timeout));
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if(res != FKO_SUCCESS)
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return(res);
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return(res);
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}
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/* Check for access.conf stanza SOURCE match based on SPA packet
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* source IP
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*/
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static int
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is_src_match(acc_stanza_t *acc, const uint32_t ip)
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{
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while (acc)
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{
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if(compare_addr_list(acc->source_list, ip))
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return 1;
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acc = acc->next;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/* Process the SPA packet data
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*/
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void
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incoming_spa(fko_srv_options_t *opts)
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{
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/* Always a good idea to initialize ctx to null if it will be used
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* repeatedly (especially when using fko_new_with_data()).
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*/
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fko_ctx_t ctx = NULL;
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char *spa_ip_demark, *gpg_id, *raw_digest = NULL;
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time_t now_ts;
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int res, status, ts_diff, enc_type, stanza_num=0;
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int added_replay_digest = 0, pkt_data_len=0;
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int is_err, cmd_exec_success = 0, attempted_decrypt = 0;
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int conf_pkt_age = 0;
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char dump_buf[CTX_DUMP_BUFSIZE];
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spa_pkt_info_t *spa_pkt = &(opts->spa_pkt);
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/* This will hold our pertinent SPA data.
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*/
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spa_data_t spadat;
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/* Loop through all access stanzas looking for a match
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*/
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acc_stanza_t *acc = opts->acc_stanzas;
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inet_ntop(AF_INET, &(spa_pkt->packet_src_ip),
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spadat.pkt_source_ip, sizeof(spadat.pkt_source_ip));
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/* At this point, we want to validate and (if needed) preprocess the
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* SPA data and/or to be reasonably sure we have a SPA packet (i.e
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* try to eliminate obvious non-spa packets).
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*/
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pkt_data_len = spa_pkt->packet_data_len;
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res = preprocess_spa_data(opts, spadat.pkt_source_ip);
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if(res != FKO_SUCCESS)
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{
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log_msg(LOG_DEBUG, "[%s] preprocess_spa_data() returned error %i: '%s' for incoming packet.",
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spadat.pkt_source_ip, res, get_errstr(res));
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return;
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}
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if(opts->foreground == 1 && opts->verbose > 2)
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{
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printf("[+] candidate SPA packet payload:\n");
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hex_dump(spa_pkt->packet_data, pkt_data_len);
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}
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if(strncasecmp(opts->config[CONF_ENABLE_SPA_PACKET_AGING], "Y", 1) == 0)
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{
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conf_pkt_age = strtol_wrapper(opts->config[CONF_MAX_SPA_PACKET_AGE],
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0, RCHK_MAX_SPA_PACKET_AGE, NO_EXIT_UPON_ERR, &is_err);
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if(is_err != FKO_SUCCESS)
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{
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log_msg(LOG_ERR, "[*] [%s] invalid MAX_SPA_PACKET_AGE", spadat.pkt_source_ip);
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return;
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}
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}
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if (is_src_match(opts->acc_stanzas, ntohl(spa_pkt->packet_src_ip)))
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{
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if(strncasecmp(opts->config[CONF_ENABLE_DIGEST_PERSISTENCE], "Y", 1) == 0)
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{
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/* Check for a replay attack
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*/
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res = get_raw_digest(&raw_digest, (char *)spa_pkt->packet_data);
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if(res != FKO_SUCCESS)
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{
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if (raw_digest != NULL)
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free(raw_digest);
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return;
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}
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if (raw_digest == NULL)
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return;
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if (is_replay(opts, raw_digest) != SPA_MSG_SUCCESS)
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{
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free(raw_digest);
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return;
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}
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}
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}
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else
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{
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log_msg(LOG_WARNING,
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"No access data found for source IP: %s", spadat.pkt_source_ip
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);
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return;
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}
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/* Now that we know there is a matching access.conf stanza and the
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* incoming SPA packet is not a replay, see if we should grant any
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* access
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*/
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while(acc)
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{
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res = FKO_SUCCESS;
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cmd_exec_success = 0;
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attempted_decrypt = 0;
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stanza_num++;
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/* Start access loop with a clean FKO context
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*/
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if(ctx != NULL)
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{
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if(fko_destroy(ctx) == FKO_ERROR_ZERO_OUT_DATA)
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log_msg(LOG_WARNING,
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"[%s] (stanza #%d) fko_destroy() could not zero out sensitive data buffer.",
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spadat.pkt_source_ip, stanza_num, fko_errstr(res)
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);
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ctx = NULL;
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}
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/* Check for a match for the SPA source IP and the access stanza
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*/
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if(! compare_addr_list(acc->source_list, ntohl(spa_pkt->packet_src_ip)))
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{
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acc = acc->next;
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continue;
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}
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log_msg(LOG_INFO, "(stanza #%d) SPA Packet from IP: %s received with access source match",
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stanza_num, spadat.pkt_source_ip);
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log_msg(LOG_DEBUG, "SPA Packet: '%s'", spa_pkt->packet_data);
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/* Make sure this access stanza has not expired
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*/
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if(acc->access_expire_time > 0)
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{
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if(acc->expired)
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{
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acc = acc->next;
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continue;
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}
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else
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{
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if(time(NULL) > acc->access_expire_time)
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{
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log_msg(LOG_INFO, "[%s] (stanza #%d) Access stanza has expired",
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spadat.pkt_source_ip, stanza_num);
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acc->expired = 1;
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acc = acc->next;
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continue;
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}
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}
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}
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/* Get encryption type and try its decoding routine first (if the key
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* for that type is set)
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*/
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enc_type = fko_encryption_type((char *)spa_pkt->packet_data);
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if(acc->use_rijndael)
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{
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if (acc->key == NULL)
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{
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log_msg(LOG_ERR,
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"[%s] (stanza #%d) No KEY for RIJNDAEL encrypted messages",
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spadat.pkt_source_ip, stanza_num
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);
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acc = acc->next;
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continue;
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}
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/* Command mode messages may be quite long
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*/
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if(acc->enable_cmd_exec || enc_type == FKO_ENCRYPTION_RIJNDAEL)
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{
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res = fko_new_with_data(&ctx, (char *)spa_pkt->packet_data,
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acc->key, acc->key_len, acc->encryption_mode, acc->hmac_key,
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acc->hmac_key_len, acc->hmac_type);
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attempted_decrypt = 1;
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if(res == FKO_SUCCESS)
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cmd_exec_success = 1;
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}
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}
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if(acc->use_gpg && enc_type == FKO_ENCRYPTION_GPG && cmd_exec_success == 0)
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{
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/* For GPG we create the new context without decrypting on the fly
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* so we can set some GPG parameters first.
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*/
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if(acc->gpg_decrypt_pw != NULL || acc->gpg_allow_no_pw)
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{
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res = fko_new_with_data(&ctx, (char *)spa_pkt->packet_data, NULL,
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0, FKO_ENC_MODE_ASYMMETRIC, acc->hmac_key,
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acc->hmac_key_len, acc->hmac_type);
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if(res != FKO_SUCCESS)
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{
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log_msg(LOG_WARNING,
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"[%s] (stanza #%d) Error creating fko context (before decryption): %s",
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spadat.pkt_source_ip, stanza_num, fko_errstr(res)
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);
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acc = acc->next;
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continue;
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}
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/* Set whatever GPG parameters we have.
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*/
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if(acc->gpg_exe != NULL)
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{
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res = fko_set_gpg_exe(ctx, acc->gpg_exe);
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if(res != FKO_SUCCESS)
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{
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log_msg(LOG_WARNING,
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"[%s] (stanza #%d) Error setting GPG path %s: %s",
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spadat.pkt_source_ip, stanza_num, acc->gpg_exe,
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fko_errstr(res)
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);
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acc = acc->next;
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continue;
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}
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}
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if(acc->gpg_home_dir != NULL)
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{
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res = fko_set_gpg_home_dir(ctx, acc->gpg_home_dir);
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if(res != FKO_SUCCESS)
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{
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log_msg(LOG_WARNING,
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"[%s] (stanza #%d) Error setting GPG keyring path to %s: %s",
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spadat.pkt_source_ip, stanza_num, acc->gpg_home_dir,
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fko_errstr(res)
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);
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acc = acc->next;
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continue;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(acc->gpg_decrypt_id != NULL)
|
|
fko_set_gpg_recipient(ctx, acc->gpg_decrypt_id);
|
|
|
|
/* If GPG_REQUIRE_SIG is set for this acc stanza, then set
|
|
* the FKO context accordingly and check the other GPG Sig-
|
|
* related parameters. This also applies when REMOTE_ID is
|
|
* set.
|
|
*/
|
|
if(acc->gpg_require_sig)
|
|
{
|
|
fko_set_gpg_signature_verify(ctx, 1);
|
|
|
|
/* Set whether or not to ignore signature verification errors.
|
|
*/
|
|
fko_set_gpg_ignore_verify_error(ctx, acc->gpg_ignore_sig_error);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
fko_set_gpg_signature_verify(ctx, 0);
|
|
fko_set_gpg_ignore_verify_error(ctx, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Now decrypt the data.
|
|
*/
|
|
res = fko_decrypt_spa_data(ctx, acc->gpg_decrypt_pw, 0);
|
|
attempted_decrypt = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(attempted_decrypt == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
log_msg(LOG_ERR,
|
|
"(stanza #%d) No stanza encryption mode match for encryption type: %i.",
|
|
stanza_num, enc_type);
|
|
acc = acc->next;
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Do we have a valid FKO context? Did the SPA decrypt properly?
|
|
*/
|
|
if(res != FKO_SUCCESS)
|
|
{
|
|
log_msg(LOG_WARNING, "[%s] (stanza #%d) Error creating fko context: %s",
|
|
spadat.pkt_source_ip, stanza_num, fko_errstr(res));
|
|
|
|
if(IS_GPG_ERROR(res))
|
|
log_msg(LOG_WARNING, "[%s] (stanza #%d) - GPG ERROR: %s",
|
|
spadat.pkt_source_ip, stanza_num, fko_gpg_errstr(ctx));
|
|
|
|
acc = acc->next;
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Add this SPA packet into the replay detection cache
|
|
*/
|
|
if (added_replay_digest == 0
|
|
&& strncasecmp(opts->config[CONF_ENABLE_DIGEST_PERSISTENCE], "Y", 1) == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
res = add_replay(opts, raw_digest);
|
|
if (res != SPA_MSG_SUCCESS)
|
|
{
|
|
log_msg(LOG_WARNING, "[%s] (stanza #%d) Could not add digest to replay cache",
|
|
spadat.pkt_source_ip, stanza_num);
|
|
acc = acc->next;
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
added_replay_digest = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* At this point, we assume the SPA data is valid. Now we need to see
|
|
* if it meets our access criteria.
|
|
*/
|
|
log_msg(LOG_DEBUG, "[%s] (stanza #%d) SPA Decode (res=%i):",
|
|
spadat.pkt_source_ip, stanza_num, res);
|
|
|
|
res = dump_ctx_to_buffer(ctx, dump_buf, sizeof(dump_buf));
|
|
if (res == FKO_SUCCESS)
|
|
log_msg(LOG_DEBUG, "%s", dump_buf);
|
|
else
|
|
log_msg(LOG_WARNING, "Unable to dump FKO context: %s", fko_errstr(res));
|
|
|
|
/* First, if this is a GPG message, and GPG_REMOTE_ID list is not empty,
|
|
* then we need to make sure this incoming message is signer ID matches
|
|
* an entry in the list.
|
|
*/
|
|
if(enc_type == FKO_ENCRYPTION_GPG && acc->gpg_require_sig)
|
|
{
|
|
res = fko_get_gpg_signature_id(ctx, &gpg_id);
|
|
if(res != FKO_SUCCESS)
|
|
{
|
|
log_msg(LOG_WARNING,
|
|
"[%s] (stanza #%d) Error pulling the GPG signature ID from the context: %s",
|
|
spadat.pkt_source_ip, stanza_num, fko_gpg_errstr(ctx));
|
|
acc = acc->next;
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log_msg(LOG_INFO, "[%s] (stanza #%d) Incoming SPA data signed by '%s'.",
|
|
spadat.pkt_source_ip, stanza_num, gpg_id);
|
|
|
|
if(acc->gpg_remote_id != NULL && !acc_check_gpg_remote_id(acc, gpg_id))
|
|
{
|
|
log_msg(LOG_WARNING,
|
|
"[%s] (stanza #%d) Incoming SPA packet signed by ID: %s, but that ID is not the GPG_REMOTE_ID list.",
|
|
spadat.pkt_source_ip, stanza_num, gpg_id);
|
|
acc = acc->next;
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Populate our spa data struct for future reference.
|
|
*/
|
|
res = get_spa_data_fields(ctx, &spadat);
|
|
|
|
/* Figure out what our timeout will be. If it is specified in the SPA
|
|
* data, then use that. If not, try the FW_ACCESS_TIMEOUT from the
|
|
* access.conf file (if there is one). Otherwise use the default.
|
|
*/
|
|
if(spadat.client_timeout > 0)
|
|
spadat.fw_access_timeout = spadat.client_timeout;
|
|
else if(acc->fw_access_timeout > 0)
|
|
spadat.fw_access_timeout = acc->fw_access_timeout;
|
|
else
|
|
spadat.fw_access_timeout = DEF_FW_ACCESS_TIMEOUT;
|
|
|
|
if(res != FKO_SUCCESS)
|
|
{
|
|
log_msg(LOG_ERR, "[%s] (stanza #%d) Unexpected error pulling SPA data from the context: %s",
|
|
spadat.pkt_source_ip, stanza_num, fko_errstr(res));
|
|
|
|
acc = acc->next;
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check packet age if so configured.
|
|
*/
|
|
if(strncasecmp(opts->config[CONF_ENABLE_SPA_PACKET_AGING], "Y", 1) == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
time(&now_ts);
|
|
|
|
ts_diff = abs(now_ts - spadat.timestamp);
|
|
|
|
if(ts_diff > conf_pkt_age)
|
|
{
|
|
log_msg(LOG_WARNING, "[%s] (stanza #%d) SPA data time difference is too great (%i seconds).",
|
|
spadat.pkt_source_ip, stanza_num, ts_diff);
|
|
|
|
acc = acc->next;
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* At this point, we have enough to check the embedded (or packet source)
|
|
* IP address against the defined access rights. We start by splitting
|
|
* the spa msg source IP from the remainder of the message.
|
|
*/
|
|
spa_ip_demark = strchr(spadat.spa_message, ',');
|
|
if(spa_ip_demark == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
log_msg(LOG_WARNING, "[%s] (stanza #%d) Error parsing SPA message string: %s",
|
|
spadat.pkt_source_ip, stanza_num, fko_errstr(res));
|
|
|
|
acc = acc->next;
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if((spa_ip_demark-spadat.spa_message) < MIN_IPV4_STR_LEN-1
|
|
|| (spa_ip_demark-spadat.spa_message) > MAX_IPV4_STR_LEN)
|
|
{
|
|
log_msg(LOG_WARNING, "[%s] (stanza #%d) Invalid source IP in SPA message, ignoring SPA packet",
|
|
spadat.pkt_source_ip, stanza_num, fko_errstr(res));
|
|
|
|
if(ctx != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
if(fko_destroy(ctx) == FKO_ERROR_ZERO_OUT_DATA)
|
|
log_msg(LOG_WARNING,
|
|
"[%s] (stanza #%d) fko_destroy() could not zero out sensitive data buffer.",
|
|
spadat.pkt_source_ip, stanza_num, fko_errstr(res)
|
|
);
|
|
ctx = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
strlcpy(spadat.spa_message_src_ip,
|
|
spadat.spa_message, (spa_ip_demark-spadat.spa_message)+1);
|
|
|
|
if(! is_valid_ipv4_addr(spadat.spa_message_src_ip))
|
|
{
|
|
log_msg(LOG_WARNING, "[%s] (stanza #%d) Invalid source IP in SPA message, ignoring SPA packet",
|
|
spadat.pkt_source_ip, stanza_num, fko_errstr(res));
|
|
|
|
if(ctx != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
if(fko_destroy(ctx) == FKO_ERROR_ZERO_OUT_DATA)
|
|
log_msg(LOG_WARNING,
|
|
"[%s] (stanza #%d) fko_destroy() could not zero out sensitive data buffer.",
|
|
spadat.pkt_source_ip, stanza_num, fko_errstr(res)
|
|
);
|
|
ctx = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
strlcpy(spadat.spa_message_remain, spa_ip_demark+1, MAX_DECRYPTED_SPA_LEN);
|
|
|
|
/* If use source IP was requested (embedded IP of 0.0.0.0), make sure it
|
|
* is allowed.
|
|
*/
|
|
if(strcmp(spadat.spa_message_src_ip, "0.0.0.0") == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
if(acc->require_source_address)
|
|
{
|
|
log_msg(LOG_WARNING,
|
|
"[%s] (stanza #%d) Got 0.0.0.0 when valid source IP was required.",
|
|
spadat.pkt_source_ip, stanza_num
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
acc = acc->next;
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
spadat.use_src_ip = spadat.pkt_source_ip;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
spadat.use_src_ip = spadat.spa_message_src_ip;
|
|
|
|
/* If REQUIRE_USERNAME is set, make sure the username in this SPA data
|
|
* matches.
|
|
*/
|
|
if(acc->require_username != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
if(strcmp(spadat.username, acc->require_username) != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
log_msg(LOG_WARNING,
|
|
"[%s] (stanza #%d) Username in SPA data (%s) does not match required username: %s",
|
|
spadat.pkt_source_ip, stanza_num, spadat.username, acc->require_username
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
acc = acc->next;
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Take action based on SPA message type.
|
|
*/
|
|
if(spadat.message_type == FKO_LOCAL_NAT_ACCESS_MSG
|
|
|| spadat.message_type == FKO_CLIENT_TIMEOUT_LOCAL_NAT_ACCESS_MSG
|
|
|| spadat.message_type == FKO_NAT_ACCESS_MSG
|
|
|| spadat.message_type == FKO_CLIENT_TIMEOUT_NAT_ACCESS_MSG)
|
|
{
|
|
#if FIREWALL_IPTABLES
|
|
if(strncasecmp(opts->config[CONF_ENABLE_IPT_FORWARDING], "Y", 1)!=0)
|
|
{
|
|
log_msg(LOG_WARNING,
|
|
"(stanza #%d) SPA packet from %s requested NAT access, but is not enabled",
|
|
stanza_num, spadat.pkt_source_ip
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
acc = acc->next;
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
#else
|
|
log_msg(LOG_WARNING,
|
|
"(stanza #%d) SPA packet from %s requested unsupported NAT access",
|
|
stanza_num, spadat.pkt_source_ip
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
acc = acc->next;
|
|
continue;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Command messages.
|
|
*/
|
|
if(spadat.message_type == FKO_COMMAND_MSG)
|
|
{
|
|
if(!acc->enable_cmd_exec)
|
|
{
|
|
log_msg(LOG_WARNING,
|
|
"[%s] (stanza #%d) SPA Command message are not allowed in the current configuration.",
|
|
spadat.pkt_source_ip, stanza_num
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
acc = acc->next;
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
log_msg(LOG_INFO,
|
|
"[%s] (stanza #%d) Processing SPA Command message: command='%s'.",
|
|
spadat.pkt_source_ip, stanza_num, spadat.spa_message_remain
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
/* Do we need to become another user? If so, we call
|
|
* run_extcmd_as and pass the cmd_exec_uid.
|
|
*/
|
|
if(acc->cmd_exec_user != NULL && strncasecmp(acc->cmd_exec_user, "root", 4) != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
log_msg(LOG_INFO, "[%s] (stanza #%d) Setting effective user to %s (UID=%i) before running command.",
|
|
spadat.pkt_source_ip, stanza_num, acc->cmd_exec_user, acc->cmd_exec_uid);
|
|
|
|
res = run_extcmd_as(acc->cmd_exec_uid,
|
|
spadat.spa_message_remain, NULL, 0, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
else /* Just run it as we are (root that is). */
|
|
res = run_extcmd(spadat.spa_message_remain, NULL, 0, 5);
|
|
|
|
/* --DSS XXX: I have found that the status (and res for that
|
|
* matter) have been unreliable indicators of the
|
|
* actual exit status of some commands. Not sure
|
|
* why yet. For now, we will take what we get.
|
|
*/
|
|
status = WEXITSTATUS(res);
|
|
|
|
if(opts->verbose > 1)
|
|
log_msg(LOG_WARNING,
|
|
"[%s] (stanza #%d) CMD_EXEC: command returned %i",
|
|
spadat.pkt_source_ip, stanza_num, status);
|
|
|
|
if(status != 0)
|
|
res = SPA_MSG_COMMAND_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
if(ctx != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
if(fko_destroy(ctx) == FKO_ERROR_ZERO_OUT_DATA)
|
|
log_msg(LOG_WARNING,
|
|
"[%s] (stanza #%d) fko_destroy() could not zero out sensitive data buffer.",
|
|
spadat.pkt_source_ip, stanza_num, fko_errstr(res)
|
|
);
|
|
ctx = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* we processed the command on a matching access stanza, so we
|
|
* don't look for anything else to do with this SPA packet
|
|
*/
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* From this point forward, we have some kind of access message. So
|
|
* we first see if access is allowed by checking access against
|
|
* restrict_ports and open_ports.
|
|
*
|
|
* --DSS TODO: We should add BLACKLIST support here as well.
|
|
*/
|
|
if(! acc_check_port_access(acc, spadat.spa_message_remain))
|
|
{
|
|
log_msg(LOG_WARNING,
|
|
"[%s] (stanza #%d) One or more requested protocol/ports was denied per access.conf.",
|
|
spadat.pkt_source_ip, stanza_num
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
acc = acc->next;
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* At this point, we process the SPA request and break out of the
|
|
* access stanza loop (first valid access stanza stops us looking
|
|
* for others).
|
|
*/
|
|
process_spa_request(opts, acc, &spadat);
|
|
if(ctx != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
if(fko_destroy(ctx) == FKO_ERROR_ZERO_OUT_DATA)
|
|
log_msg(LOG_WARNING,
|
|
"[%s] (stanza #%d) fko_destroy() could not zero out sensitive data buffer.",
|
|
spadat.pkt_source_ip, stanza_num
|
|
);
|
|
ctx = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (raw_digest != NULL)
|
|
free(raw_digest);
|
|
|
|
if(ctx != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
if(fko_destroy(ctx) == FKO_ERROR_ZERO_OUT_DATA)
|
|
log_msg(LOG_WARNING,
|
|
"[%s] fko_destroy() could not zero out sensitive data buffer.",
|
|
spadat.pkt_source_ip
|
|
);
|
|
ctx = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/***EOF***/
|