Bug fix to correct a memory leak in GnuPG SPA packet handling within
the gpg_decrypt() function. Here is the specific valgrind leak record
that enabled the bug to be found (note that the new valgrind
suppressions usage was critical for finding this bug among all other
libgpgme memory leaks):
==23983== 1,044 bytes in 1 blocks are definitely lost in loss record 7 of 8
==23983== at 0x4C2C494: calloc (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
==23983== by 0x4E41D3A: gpg_decrypt (fko_encryption.c:422)
==23983== by 0x4E42520: fko_decrypt_spa_data (fko_encryption.c:626)
==23983== by 0x1155B0: incoming_spa (incoming_spa.c:519)
==23983== by 0x1180A7: process_packet (process_packet.c:211)
==23983== by 0x506D857: ??? (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpcap.so.1.4.0)
==23983== by 0x117865: pcap_capture (pcap_capture.c:270)
==23983== by 0x10F937: main (fwknopd.c:353)
- [server] When GnuPG is used, the default now is to require that
incoming SPA packets are signed by a key listed in GPG_REMOTE_ID for each
access.conf stanza. In other words, the usage of GPG_REQUIRE_SIG
is no longer necessary in order to authenticate SPA packets via the
GnuPG signature. Verification of GnuPG signatures can be disabled with a
new access.conf variable GPG_DISABLE_SIG, but this is NOT a
recommended configuration.
- [client+server] Add --gpg-exe command line argument and GPG_EXE
config variable to ~/.fwknoprc and the access.conf file so that the path
to GnuPG can be changed from the default /usr/bin/gpg path.
This commit implements more rigorous SPA packet field count validation
that takes into account expected field counts for each SPA message type.
Two new libfko error codes have been added in support of this, and the
corresponding changes made in the perl and python modules.
Allow usernames that are compatible with Microsoft guidelines as defined
here:
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb726984.aspx
This allows for greater compatibility between fwknop clients on Windows
(for example that may be deployed with Cygwin) and fwknopd on other
systems. This change was suggested by Gerry Reno, and tracked by Github
issue #114.
This commit updates all authorship and copyright information to include a
standard header that references the AUTHORS and CREDITS file. This standard
header was written by the Debian legal team at the request of Franck Joncourt.
Integer lengths that are negative are never valid. This commit also
extends the fuzzing capabilities of the test/fko-wrapper code to
validate libfko calls with negative length arguments, and one crash
scenario with a negative length for the encryption key was found (and
fixed) this way.
[libfko] Bug fix to not attempt SPA packet decryption with GnuPG without
an fko object with encryption_mode set to FKO_ENC_MODE_ASYMMETRIC. This
bug was caught with valgrind validation against the perl FKO extension
together with the set of SPA fuzzing packets in
test/fuzzing/fuzzing_spa_packets. Note that this bug cannot be
triggered via fwknopd because additional checks are made within fwknopd
itself to force FKO_ENC_MODE_ASYMMETRIC whenever an access.conf stanza
contains GPG key information. This fix strengthens libfko itself to
independently require that the usage of fko objects without GPG key
information does not result in attempted GPG decryption operations. Hence
this fix applies mostly to third party usage of libfko - i.e. stock
installations of fwknopd are not affected. As always, it is recommended to
use HMAC authenticated encryption whenever possible even for GPG modes since
this also provides a work around even for libfko prior to this fix.
This commit implements a single shared utility function for checking the
validaty of an IPv4 address, and both libfko and the fwknopd server use it
now. The client will be updated as well.
This commit replaces the separately implemented client/server
is_base64() check with a single libfko function, and libfko itself now
uses it as well before prepending Rijndael or GnuPG base64 encoded
prefixes.
Nikolay Kolev reported a build issue on Mac OS X 10.9 (Mavericks) where fwknop
copies of strlcpy() and strlcat() functions were conflicting with those that ship
with OS X 10.9.
The solution was to add a configure.ac check for strlcat() and strlcpy() and
wrap "#if !HAVE_..." checks around those functions.
A portion of the build errors looked like this:
/Applications/Xcode.app/Contents/Developer/usr/bin/make all-recursive
Making all in lib
/bin/sh ../libtool --tag=CC --mode=compile gcc -DHAVE_CONFIG_H -I. -I.. -I ../common -g -O2 -Wall -Wformat -Wformat-security -fstack-protector-all -fstack-protector -fPIE -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 -MT base64.lo -MD -MP -MF .deps/base64.Tpo -c -o base64.lo base64.c
libtool: compile: gcc -DHAVE_CONFIG_H -I. -I.. -I ../common -g -O2 -Wall -Wformat -Wformat-security -fstack-protector-all -fstack-protector -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 -MT base64.lo -MD -MP -MF .deps/base64.Tpo -c base64.c -fno-common -DPIC -o .libs/base64.o
In file included from base64.c:34:
In file included from ./fko_common.h:149:
./fko_util.h:56:9: error: expected parameter declarator
size_t strlcat(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz);
^
/usr/include/secure/_string.h:111:44: note: expanded from macro 'strlcat'
__builtin___strlcat_chk (dest, src, len, __darwin_obsz (dest))
^
/usr/include/secure/_common.h:39:62: note: expanded from macro '__darwin_obsz'
#define __darwin_obsz(object) __builtin_object_size (object, _USE_FORTIFY_LEVEL > 1 ? 1 : 0)
^
