Added validation of NAT access strings in the various NAT modes in libfko.
This applies to both the client and server, and test suite support was added
as well.
Applied patch from Franck Joncourt to have the perl FKO module link
against libfko in the local directory (if it exists) so that it doesn't
have to have libfko completely installed in /usr/lib/. This allows the
test suite to run FKO tests without installing libfko.
Added the ability to the test suite to compile, install, and run some
basic tests against the perl FKO module.
- [client] Added '-P udpraw' to allow the client to send SPA packets over
UDP with a spoofed source IP address. This is in addition to the
original 'tcpraw' and 'icmp' protocols that also support a spoofed
source IP.
- [server] Bug fix to accept SPA packets over ICMP if the fwknop client
is executed with '-P icmp' and the user has the required privileges.
(Vlad Glagolev) Submitted a patch to fix command exec mode
under SPA message type validity test. Support for command exec mode was
also added to the test suite.
Applied patch from Vlad Glagolev to fix ndbm/gdbm usage when --disable-file-cache
is used for the autoconf configure script. This functionality was broken in
be4193d734 through improper handling of #define
macros from --disable-file-cache.
Fernando Arnaboldi from IOActive found several conditions in
which the server did not properly throw out maliciously constructed
variables in the access.conf file. This has been fixed along with new
fuzzing tests in the test suite.
- [client+server] Fernando Arnaboldi from IOActive found that strict
filesystem permissions for various fwknop files are not verified. Added
warnings whenever permissions are not strict enough, and ensured that
files created by the fwknop client and server are only set to user
read/write.
- [client] Fernando Arnaboldi from IOActive found a local buffer overflow
in --last processing with a maliciously constructed ~/.fwknop.run file.
This has been fixed with proper validation of .fwknop.run arguments.
This commit fixes a condition in which the server did not properly validate
allow IP addresses from malicious authenticated clients. This has been fixed
with stronger allow IP validation.
- [server] Fernando Arnaboldi from IOActive found several DoS/code
execution vulnerabilities for malicious fwknop clients that manage to
get past the authentication stage (so a such a client must be in
possession of a valid access.conf encryption key). These vulnerbilities
manifested themselves in the handling of malformed access requests, and
both the fwknopd server code along with libfko now perform stronger input
validation of access request data. These vulnerabilities affect
pre-2.0.3 fwknop releases.
- [test suite] Added a new fuzzing capability to ensure proper server-side
input validation. Fuzzing data is constructed with modified fwknop
client code that is designed to emulate malicious behavior.
Updated the 'make install' step to not overwrite any existing config files in
/etc/fwknop/ and instead install new copies from the source tree at
/etc/fwknop/fwknopd.conf.inst and /etc/fwknop/access.conf.inst
Set restrictive permissions on /etc/fwknop/ directory and /etc/fwknop/* files.
Current default permissions on /etc/fwknop/ and /etc/fwknop/* are too lax.
Implemented a new check to ensure that the iptables 'comment' match exists to
ensure the proper environment for fwknopd operations. This check is controlled
by the new ENABLE_IPT_COMMENT_CHECK variable, and was suggested by Hank
Leininger.
For GPG mode, added a new access.conf variable "GPG_ALLOW_NO_PW" to make it
possible to leverage a server-side GPG key pair that has no associated
password. This comes in handy when a system requires the user to leverage
gpg-agent / pinentry which can present a problem in automated environments as
required by the fwknopd server. Now, it might seem like a problem to remove
the passphrase from a GPG key pair, but it's important to note that simply
doing this is little worse than storing the passphrase in the clear on disk
anyway in the access.conf file. Further, this link help provides additional
detail:
http://www.gnupg.org/faq/GnuPG-FAQ.html#how-can-i-use-gnupg-in-an-automated-environment
[server] Updated PCAP_LOOP_SLEEP default to 1/10th of a second (in
microseconds). This was supposed to be the default anyway, but C
Anthony Risinger reported a bug where fwknopd was consuming more
resources than necessary, and the cause was PCAP_LOOP_SLEEP set by
default to 1/100th of a second - this has been fixed.
This commit fixes memory leaks like the following in the fwknop client:
HEAP SUMMARY:
in use at exit: 300 bytes in 11 blocks
total heap usage: 100 allocs, 89 frees, 16,583 bytes allocated
16 bytes in 1 blocks are indirectly lost in loss record 1 of 11
at 0x4C2B6CD: malloc (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
by 0x5146C59: __nss_lookup_function (nsswitch.c:456)
by 0x5C3D63E: ???
by 0x50FF3FC: getpwuid_r@@GLIBC_2.2.5 (getXXbyYY_r.c:256)
by 0x508938E: cuserid (cuserid.c:37)
by 0x4E3983A: fko_set_username (fko_user.c:65)
by 0x4E38D5C: fko_new (fko_funcs.c:84)
by 0x10A824: main (fwknop.c:75)
16 bytes in 1 blocks are indirectly lost in loss record 2 of 11
at 0x4C2B6CD: malloc (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
by 0x5146C59: __nss_lookup_function (nsswitch.c:456)
by 0x5C3D658: ???
by 0x50FF3FC: getpwuid_r@@GLIBC_2.2.5 (getXXbyYY_r.c:256)
by 0x508938E: cuserid (cuserid.c:37)
by 0x4E3983A: fko_set_username (fko_user.c:65)
by 0x4E38D5C: fko_new (fko_funcs.c:84)
by 0x10A824: main (fwknop.c:75)
16 bytes in 1 blocks are indirectly lost in loss record 3 of 11
at 0x4C2B6CD: malloc (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
by 0x5146C59: __nss_lookup_function (nsswitch.c:456)
by 0x5C3D672: ???
by 0x50FF3FC: getpwuid_r@@GLIBC_2.2.5 (getXXbyYY_r.c:256)
by 0x508938E: cuserid (cuserid.c:37)
by 0x4E3983A: fko_set_username (fko_user.c:65)
by 0x4E38D5C: fko_new (fko_funcs.c:84)
by 0x10A824: main (fwknop.c:75)
16 bytes in 1 blocks are indirectly lost in loss record 4 of 11
at 0x4C2B6CD: malloc (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)
by 0x5146C59: __nss_lookup_function (nsswitch.c:456)
by 0x5C3D68C: ???
by 0x50FF3FC: getpwuid_r@@GLIBC_2.2.5 (getXXbyYY_r.c:256)
by 0x508938E: cuserid (cuserid.c:37)
by 0x4E3983A: fko_set_username (fko_user.c:65)
by 0x4E38D5C: fko_new (fko_funcs.c:84)
by 0x10A824: main (fwknop.c:75)
with the same command line arguments as the previous time it was
executed. The previous arguments are parsed out of the ~/.fwknop.run
file (if it exists).
* Bug fix to not send any SPA packet out on the wire if a NULL password/key
is provided to the fwknop client. This could happen if the user tried to
abort fwknop execution by sending the process a SIGINT while being
prompted to enter the password/key for SPA encryption.
git-svn-id: file:///home/mbr/svn/fwknop/trunk@193 510a4753-2344-4c79-9c09-4d669213fbeb
SPA packets can be limited from the command line. When this limit is
reached (any packet that contains application layer data and passes the
pcap filter is included in the count) then fwknopd exits.
git-svn-id: file:///home/mbr/svn/fwknop/trunk@179 510a4753-2344-4c79-9c09-4d669213fbeb
the http_proxy environmental variable for sending SPA packets through an
HTTP proxy. The patch also adds support for specifying an HTTP proxy
user and password via the following syntax:
'http://username:password@proxy.com:port' or
'http://username:password@proxy.com'
git-svn-id: file:///home/mbr/svn/fwknop/trunk@164 510a4753-2344-4c79-9c09-4d669213fbeb
