This commit changes iptables policy parsing to re-use rule_exists() for fwknop
jump rule detection instead of using sscanf() against iptables policy list
output. Also, fwknop jump rules are now deleted from iptables policies in a
loop to ensure all are removed even if there are duplicates (even though this
should not happen under normal circumstances anyway).
Bug fix for --nat-rand-port mode to ensure that the port to be
NAT'd is properly defined so that the fwknopd server will NAT
connnections to this port instead of applying the NAT operation to the
port that is to be accessed via -A. This change also prints the
randomly assigned port to stdout regardless of whether --verbose mode is
used (since it not then the user will have no idea which port is
actually going to be NAT'd on the fwknopd side).
This is a fairly significant commit that lays the groundwork for getting
selectable HMAC modes working for both the client and server. One libfko API
change was required so that the hmac_type is passed into fko_new_with_data().
This allows the server to set the hmac_type via access.conf stanzas. The
effort in this commit will be extended to allow HMAC MD5, SHA1, and SHA512
also function properly.
This commit replaces a few additional atoi() calls with the strtol() wrapper
function, and also fixes a bug where access SOURCE IP/mask combinations would
not be accepted when the string length was a long as something like
'123.123.123.123/255.255.255.255'.
[libfko] Added the ability to maintain backwards compatibility with the
now deprecated "zero padding" strategy in AES mode that was a hold over
from the old perl fwknop implementation. This enables the backwards
compatiblity tests to continue to pass in the test suite.
Added a few backwards compatibility tests for versions of fwknop going back to
2.0, and also added a compatibility test for an SPA packet produced by Android
4.2.1.
Added a new '--pcap-file <file>' option to allow pcap files to
be processed directly by fwknopd instead of sniffing an interface. This
feature is mostly intended for debugging purposes.
- [client] Added '-P udpraw' to allow the client to send SPA packets over
UDP with a spoofed source IP address. This is in addition to the
original 'tcpraw' and 'icmp' protocols that also support a spoofed
source IP.
- [server] Bug fix to accept SPA packets over ICMP if the fwknop client
is executed with '-P icmp' and the user has the required privileges.
(Vlad Glagolev) Submitted a patch to fix command exec mode
under SPA message type validity test. Support for command exec mode was
also added to the test suite.
Fernando Arnaboldi from IOActive found several conditions in
which the server did not properly throw out maliciously constructed
variables in the access.conf file. This has been fixed along with new
fuzzing tests in the test suite.
- [server] Fernando Arnaboldi from IOActive found several DoS/code
execution vulnerabilities for malicious fwknop clients that manage to
get past the authentication stage (so a such a client must be in
possession of a valid access.conf encryption key). These vulnerbilities
manifested themselves in the handling of malformed access requests, and
both the fwknopd server code along with libfko now perform stronger input
validation of access request data. These vulnerabilities affect
pre-2.0.3 fwknop releases.
- [test suite] Added a new fuzzing capability to ensure proper server-side
input validation. Fuzzing data is constructed with modified fwknop
client code that is designed to emulate malicious behavior.
For GPG mode, added a new access.conf variable "GPG_ALLOW_NO_PW" to make it
possible to leverage a server-side GPG key pair that has no associated
password. This comes in handy when a system requires the user to leverage
gpg-agent / pinentry which can present a problem in automated environments as
required by the fwknopd server. Now, it might seem like a problem to remove
the passphrase from a GPG key pair, but it's important to note that simply
doing this is little worse than storing the passphrase in the clear on disk
anyway in the access.conf file. Further, this link help provides additional
detail:
http://www.gnupg.org/faq/GnuPG-FAQ.html#how-can-i-use-gnupg-in-an-automated-environment